Recent indo us defence deals

The United States is one of India's largest direct investors. This is a compound rate increase of Indian direct investments abroad began in , and Indian corporations and registered partnership firms are now allowed to invest in businesses up to percent of their net worth. India's largest outgoing investments are in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for The second largest are in non-financial services software development , accounting for STA-1 enables the export of high-technology products in civil space and defence from the US to India. The US is India's second largest trading partner , and India is its 9th largest trading partner.

Major American items imported by India include aircraft , fertilisers , computer hardware , scrap metal , and medical equipment. Americans have made notable foreign investments in the Asian country's power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries. The 10 major commodities exported from India to the US were: [] []. The 10 major commodities exported from the US to India were: [] [].

The goal of the programme is to increase bilateral trade and investment flow. There are five main sub-divisions of the Trade Policy Forum, including:. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

1st Indo-US defence pact post S deal with Russia | Deccan Herald

Further information: History of Indian foreign relations. See also: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Ground Report - Target 2025: Shift in India's defence production

Main article: CIA activities in India. Main article: Devyani Khobragade incident. Balkrishna Dave, an India-born U. Army paratrooper explains weapons range safety procedures to Indian Army soldiers before they fire American machine guns. Yudh Abhyas.

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India-USA: History of Relations

January 15, Retrieved April 2, Archived from the original PDF on May 4, Retrieved March 25, Indian Express. September 8, May 25, The Hindu. January 25, The Diplomat. June 11, Retrieved August 30, The Japan Times.

The Indian Express. Retrieved December 9, March 13, Retrieved February 6, Retrieved January 1, David Leninson, Karen Christensen eds. International Migration Review. India Review. Random House Digital, Inc. McMahon June 1, Columbia University Press. Despite keen attention to Pakistan's potential strategic significance, most US planners rated India as far the more valuable diplomatic prize. American policy towards the subcontinent consequently leaned toward India throughout the late s. The opening of bilateral relations with New Delhi and Karachi and the reasons for the initial Truman administration tilt toward the former will be explored in the next chapter.

August 13, Retrieved November 28, Volume Two 2: The Times of India. January 21, Retrieved December 17, Hindustan Times. August 16, Retrieved August 16, Business Standard. December 4, July — September Strategic Analysis. Retrieved September 27, Retrieved December 30, US State Department. Retrieved October 20, BBC News. June 29, India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation.

University of California Press. The Deseret News. May 22, Retrieved September 5, The American Presidency Project. Retrieved 30 August ". Michigan State University. May 14, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Pakistan Vision. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist.


Boeing India. Archived from the original on February 9, December 10, September 3, Office of the United States Trade Representative. International Trade Administration. October 6, Amritt, Inc. The Independent. November 8, July 11, March 16, Brookings Institution. Archived from the original on March 9, Retrieved March 18, November 20, February 5, The Times Of India.

August 2, Christian Science Monitor. July 3, Diplomats Over Spying Claims". The Wall Street Journal. July 2, India Today. Reuters India. January 24, May 15, Archived from the original on June 15, Foreign Policy. February 20, Page Not Found — Bloomberg". Archived from the original on July 5, Archived from the original on July 15, Department of State.

The New York Times. Archived from the original on May 11, Retrieved November 8, New York Times. International Business Times. BBC World News. December 20, Embassy security barriers in spat". December 18, Retrieved December 29, NBC News. January 8, Archived from the original on January 8, Chennai, India. The Guardian. February 9, Diplomatic Spat". Times of India. February 17, Washington Post. December 17, May 28, Retrieved May 29, June 1, December 19, June 2, December 5, Voice of America VOA.

May 19, The Express Tribune. US Department of State. September 13, Narendra Modi and U. Carnegie South Asia Program. May 12, Market Watch. Pinterest Reddit. Over the past year, the United States and Indian militaries participated in five major exercises, executed more than fifty other military exchanges, and further operationalized the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement LEMOA , he informed the lawmakers.

Observing that the goal of the US Indo Pacific Command in South Asia is to create and seize opportunities to broaden critical partnerships to ensure shared domains remain open to all, he said in conjunction with India's contributions to regional security, these actions will prevent adversaries from establishing an effective military presence in the Indian Ocean that threaten the security of vital commerce and continued economic growth and development.

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India-US defence sales at all time high: Pentagon

South Asia. United States Department of Defense. M howitzer. Indian Armed Forces. Follow us on. Download et app. Secondly, contrary to the perception that the missile plan would impel China to expand its nuclear missile stockpiles, at present India did not fear such an outcome, but he refused to say whether growing cooperation was aimed at deterring China. However, it should be pointed out that while politico-military ties have continued to grow, the trade and investment relationship, despite its enormous potential, has continued to flounder if not stagnate.

India, after successfully implementing its first round of economic reforms in the early s failed to maintain the momentum. Many bureaucratic hurdles remain and progress on privatisation has slowed. Structural reforms appear to have stalled and the economy is now in its fourth year of slowdown. Zoellick has pointed out, India's tariffs and regulatory barriers remain high. Although the average tariff rate has fallen to about 30 per cent, it is still twice as high as China's average rate and 10 times as high as that of the United States.

US investment in India has not had a very successful track record either. Perhaps even more telling is that US firms ended up investing only 38 per cent of that approved by the Government of India. In certain quarters there still seems to be an elemental distrust of foreign investment. However, attempts are underway to improve IndiaUS business links. The two countries have initiated a dialogue in economics with the full participation of the private sector and in the areas of trade, finance, environment, energy security and power.

Additionally specific fields including information technology, agricultural biotechnology and medical technology and pharmaceuticals have been identified as having significant potential for future business ties. While the IndiaUS engagement had been proceeding at a fairly fast pace right from the beginning of the Bush administration, it gained a new sense of immediacy after September In a speech delivered in New Delhi on 2 September soon after he had presented his credentials , the US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, reiterated the earlier US position saying that 'President Bush has a global approach to USIndia relations, consistent with the rise of India as a world power' adding that this was 'because no nation can promote its values and advance its interests without the help of allies and friends'.

Bush waived all nuclear related sanctions on India and Pakistan. This point is significant in that it equated the events in the US to the attack Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly building in Srinagar, allegedly by Pakistan-based terrorists expressed satisfaction with the progress made in India-US cooperation on counter-terrorism announced the establishment of a Joint Cyber-Terrorism Initiative agreed to begin a dialogue 'between the two governments with a view towards evaluating the processes by which we transfer dual-use and military items, with a view towards greater transparency and efficiency' agreed to initiate discussions on civil space cooperation.

Following the events of September but probably reflecting the strategic realities of the post Cold War world and America's increasing appreciation of the part India must play in the regional balancethere has been a substantial change in US military cooperation with India in recent months.

At a meeting of the USIndia Defence Policy Group DPG in December , the two sides committed themselves to substantially increase the pace of high-level policy dialogue, military-to-military exchanges and other joint activities details of these activities can be found at Appendix B. Issues covered included terrorism as well as sharing of military intelligence. It also paves the way for the future sale of US weapons to India.

Clearly the events of September changed the dynamics of USIndia defence relations. Regarding Indian military acquisitions from Russia, the US attitude is that India was a free country and as such it was free to acquire defence systems from any country. Further, given the changed international situation, good relations between India and Russia were now in the interests of the US.

In a move likely to cause concern in Pakistan and China, joint exercises involving specialised mountain warfare troops are scheduled to take place in Alaska in September In a parallel move, India and the UK intend holding a joint amphibious exercise at an unspecified date. Britain will also send an expert on improvised explosives devices to help India's efforts in combating terrorism. It should be pointed out that the May DPG meeting took place at a time when tensions between India and Pakistan were very high.

As the Times of India observed, ' i n what may count as one of the more remarkable chapters in the checkered history of IndoUS relations, New Delhi and Washington are engaged in a serious long-term military tie-up in the shadow of an immediate war in the sub-continent that the Bush administration is trying to prevent'.

A major hurdle in the development of India-US relations in the past has been what could be termed the 'third country prism'. Development of USChina relations had the same impact. Until recently, conventional wisdom had it that the rapid growth in China-Burma relations would be inimical to India's security in its northeast region. The following paragraphs briefly discuss developments in these three-way relationships.

For almost half a decade, India's relations with the US were heavily influenced by the politics of the Cold War, India's policy of non-alignment as well as US perception that Pakistan was a trusted ally in its fight to contain communism. At no time was this more evident than during the period of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan when Pakistan became a front line state in the war against communism as well as a conduit for the supply of arms and other support to the Afghan resistance.

Subsequent cooling of USPakistan relations have ensured that Pakistan is no longer a major factor in the improvement of IndiaUS relations. Detailed analysis is at Appendix C. China became a factor in IndiaUS relations following the normalisation of its ties with the US in and the subsequent 'tilt' by both countries towards Pakistan during its war with India that year. It is only during the last decade or so that IndiaUS relations have not been influenced by relations with China and have developed a synergy of their own. For detailed analysis, see Appendix D.

It has been argued by some that the developing closeness of China's relations with Burma would be inimical to the strategic stability of the region as China seeks overland access to Burma's ports in the Bay of Bengal as a means of sidestepping potential containment by the US Map 5. The US has taken no official position on the growing closer relationship between China and Burma. What has escaped the attention of most observers is that both India and China are of the view that their bilateral relations and their relations with Burma are not mutually exclusive.

In fact, it can be said that there is an element of cooperation that would be of benefit to all three countries. India's developing closeness with Burma in no way contradicts the US view that India is a responsible player in the region. See Appendix E. Not only is India the largest power in the ocean named after it, it also has the largest navy and coast guard of any state between the two most commercial straits in the world- Hormuz and Malacca. In addition, not only are the Straits of Malacca and the Strait of Lombok acknowledged to be two of the most crucial strategic straits in the world, more than half of the world's maritime trade passes through them Map 7.

In this region, more than a thousand miles from India's mainland lie its Andaman and Nicobar group of islands Map 6 the southmost of which is barely 90 nautical miles from the troubled Indonesian province of Aceh.

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Of the island cluster, over are inhabited and are suspected of being used as transit points by gun runners, smugglers including drug smugglers and poachers. The region is also notorious for acts of piracy. India's action initially caused a certain degree of disquiet among its ASEAN neighbours because of the size of its navy and its perceived closeness to the Soviet Union. But this reaction was short lived as India became more open about its motives and the Indian Navy was soon paying port calls to and conducting exercises with the navies of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.

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In August , India decided to upgrade its presence in the Andamans and set up its first tri-services command, the Far Eastern Strategic Command. Its military presence already includes air force helicopters, three naval Fast Attack Craft FAC and offshore patrol vessels. Eventually, India is expected to have a full strength army component and an air base in the Andamans. This will give India strategic depth to compliment its ability to protect maritime traffic bound for the South China Sea and Australia.

An instance of this is the escort provided to a US vessel recently. Reaction to this activity has been favourable. They users of the Straits need not rely on the patrolling team only'. He went on to say that any nation had the right to escort their ships to ensure security without the need to seek permission from Malaysia or Indonesia as this did not violate international law. India has not only been coordinating its efforts to combat maritime threats with countries in the region but with countries as far away as Japan.

A joint IndiaJapan Coast Guard Exercise took place for the first time in Indian waters in November and a second joint exercise was conducted off the coast of Japan in A strategic dialogue took place earlier this year. He added that IndiaJapan relations were poised for a quantum leap in the security, economic and political spheres.

Delivering the Annual Singapore Lecture , he observed: We have crucial stakes in protecting our common sea lanes, combating piracy, choking off narco-trade and curbing gunrunning. We need to tackle this jointly in a determined manner, through regular exchange of experiences, information and intelligence. India has to be integral to any regional process pertaining to the Asia Pacific. We have a constructive and multi-faceted relationship with every major country of the region.

Consequently, it can be argued that given its historical military relations with Vietnam and its growing strategic ties with Japan, India will have a role in the evolving security structure in the wider AsiaPacific region. This trend would be underscored by the growing strategic and military ties with the US Pacific Command. While this paper has focused primarily on IndiaUS relations, the enhanced relationship between the two also has implications for Australia as part of the Asia Pacific region.

US acceptance of India as a responsible player in the region implies that Australia needs to expand it strategic outlook to include India and the Eastern Indian Ocean region. There are indications that this is happening, but clearly more work needs to be done. Sporadic attempts by Australian governments to generate interest in an Indian Ocean policy have met with mixed success. India perceived Australia as part of the western alliance while its own policy of non-alignment was viewed as having a pro-Soviet orientation.

The strengthening of AustraliaIndia relations in the s included establishment of the AustraliaIndia Council in followed by the Indian Government's establishment of the IndiaAustralia Council in There were also a series of high level bilateral visits, including a visit by the then Vice-President now President K. Narayanan in the most senior Indian official to visit Australia , Senator Bob McMullan, then Minister for Trade, leading the largest Australian business mission to visit India in and, in late , Australia held a major promotion in India called AustraliaIndia New Horizons with the aim of promoting a broader image of Australia.

A setback came with India's nuclear tests in May and Australia's strong and unequivocal response compared to President Clinton's reaction when he said that he was 'deeply disturbed' and 'strongly' opposed any new tests. India clearly pays no heed to the world opinion in this matter or to the hopes of people everywhere sic for a world free of nuclear testing.

I strongly urge India to cease immediately all further testing. On 14 May, Mr Downer announced suspension of bilateral defence relations with India, including the withdrawal of Australia's Defence Adviser stationed in New Delhi, the cancellation of ship and aircraft visits, officer exchanges and other defence-related visits. Australian Defence Force personnel currently training in India were to be withdrawn and Australia would request the immediate departure of three Indian defence personnel currently at defence colleges in Australia.

Australia would also suspend non-humanitarian aid and Ministerial and Senior Official visits. The reaction of the Government of India was equally forthright. The comments of the representatives of the Australian Government have not only trivialised India's legitimate security concerns and misrepresented the compelling reasons for India to undertake these tests but are also innocent of any understanding of the security environment in Southern Asia. Among other measures India decided to decline the invitation extended to the Indian Defence Secretary to visit Australia, to suspend all proposals for bilateral military cooperation, to deny Australian naval ships permission to visit Indian ports or operate in Indian territorial waters and to deny overflight facilities to Australian military aircraft.

Australia's reaction to India's nuclear tests was significant in terms of the defence and political relations, but not, however, materially. The Australian reaction had no evident effect on bilateral trade and investment relations. By , India was Australia's 17th largest trading partner and bilateral trade between the two countries had grown at an annual rate of 15 per cent between Parthasarthy, said that activities of banks and other business institutions remain unaffected 'despite the policy differences that we have with the Australian Government on issues like the dependence on foreign nuclear deterrents and nuclear disarmament'.

The policy of suspension of high level contacts did not last very long. In December Australia decided to lift its ban on visits by ministers and senior officials, reportedly days after the US decided to lift certain economic and military aid sanctions. Fischer was quoted as saying: If you are an island continent you tend to think about border security differently than if you are a country adjoining major and minor powers, and which, since World War II, you have been at war with that would sear the minds of many quite understandably. On the nuclear question however, he added: 'I stand by exactly what Australia did on this issue last year.

Fischer's visit was also different because he did not include a visit to Pakistan: traditionally, visits by Australian ministers to the subcontinent have included both India and Pakistan. In spite of being the first high level contact between the two countries, there was no change in Australia's policy towards India. In June , a spokesman was quoted as saying 'We do not believe conditions justify lifting sanctions at present.

The two ministers exchanged invitations to visit each other's country and it was decided that the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dr Ashton Calvert, would go to India for a senior officials' meeting. Before his departure Mr Downer stated: Australia continues to have concerns about the implications of India's nuclear tests, and we continue to strongly encourage India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

However, the bilateral relationship is broader than this one set of issues, and I would like to use my visit to re-energise the relationship between our two countries. Although overshadowed by President Clinton's visit, Mr Downer's visit appears to have involved a change from the strong rhetoric that followed the nuclear tests. In an interview with Delhi-based Australian journalists, Mr Downer stated that 'what the international community can say is that it's not obviously going to get the Indian Government to abandon its nuclear capability'.

The two sides agreed not only to resume defence ties but also to ensure that 'there was a steady flow of high level contacts. Full normalisation of relations was symbolised by the visit of Prime Minister Howard in July Another important milestone in the development of bilateral relations was achieved by the visit of the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, in June During his visit it was agreed that the two countries would initiate a strategic dialogue at senior officer level.

The talks were 'open, constructive and wide ranging, and demonstrated shared perspectives and common interests on a number of issues, including in the AsiaPacific and Indian Ocean regions. The delegates agreed that both countries were factors for stability in these regions'. A significant feature of these talks was that as well as foreign affairs officials, each delegation also included a senior armed forces officer. According to the Media Release , 80 the talks focussed on the need to strengthen the strategic aspects of the bilateral relationship and that the two countries were working towards holding direct military-to-military talks towards the end of Traditionally, Australia's foreign policy focus has been on 'Asia', a region stretching from Japan at one end and Thailand at the other.

India has been relegated to a separate 'box' and relations with it treated as such. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Australia's foreign policy white paper In the National Interest which stated that 'India will become more important as its links with East Asia and the rest of the world deepen, as they are likely to over the next fifteen years' emphasis added. The review was more realistic and the contrast could not have been sharper.

In a remarkably perceptive observation, it stated, inter alia : India in particular, is assuming a growing strategic and economic importance in global and regional affairs. In the short term, however, it is unlikely that either India or Pakistan with their largely sub-regional focus and their own internal security problemswill have a major impact on the East Asian security environment.

Nonetheless, given the longer-term potential for these countries, particularly India, to play a more prominent role in the strategic affairs of the Asia-Pacific region, we will continue to work to develop a strategic dialogue with it. This point was reiterated in the defence white paper, Defence Our Future Defence Force released in There are, therefore, some signs of change in Australia's perception of the strategic importance of India but with no indication of an integrated regional security perspective on Australia's part, so far.

Greater naval cooperation with India would be a good starting point, given that a sizeable proportion of Australia's maritime trade towards the west passes through the Strait of Lombok and then through the Malacca Straits. A case could also be made for the establishment of an Australian coast guard, which could eventually become part of a network of regional coastguards policing non-military threats.

Greater recognition could also be given to the fact that the threats in the region are largely non-militarypiracy, drugs, arms and people smuggling to name a few, threats that India and Australia share in common. In this context, it is relevant to note that the first meeting between ASEAN and the European Union Experts Group held in Manila recently proposed the formation of a 'neutral flag patrol fleet' that would be allowed to pursue pirates beyond a country's territorial waters.

While IndiaUS relations floundered for nearly half a century, the recent pace of development of these ties have taken many observers by surprise. Instead of the gradual evolution that had characterised the bilateral relationship over a period of more than two decades, President Clinton's visit galvanised the pace at which it was proceeding. Whether it was a consequence of a tacit acknowledgement by the US of India's 'unofficial' nuclear status, its economic reforms, its acceptance as a pre-eminent regional power and a source of stability in the Indian Ocean region, or a reflection of a changed mind set of decision-makers on both sides in a post-cold war environment, the fact remains that these developments could not have been foreseen by any observer in , the year India tested its nuclear devices.

The US no longer appears to view its relationship with India primarily through the prism of its relations with other countries in the region, or indeed with Cold War blinkers. This process started, albeit haltingly, with the end of the Cold War. Given the improvement in USRussia relations, the US now appears to have no objections to Russia being India's largest supplier of military hardware. On the contrary, the US itself is in the process of becoming one of the major suppliers along with Israel and South Africa. Moreover, despite its own, sometimes volatile, political relationship with China, there is no indication that it views the improvement in IndiaChina relations with any degree of concern.

In other words, the US, finally, is acknowledging the legitimacy of India's pursuit of an independent foreign policy; while there will be close politico-strategic-military ties between India and the US, there will be no 'alliance' relationship. It can be argued that India is well aware of the fact that as has been observed in the context of Australia relations 'you only have to think like a deputy to look like a deputy, and look like a deputy long enough and one day they'll pin a badge on you and tell you to shut up and do as you're told'.

Perhaps the most significant development in the strategic relationship is that it has finally been decoupled from US relations with Pakistan. In the past this had been a major hurdle preventing any significant improvement in IndiaUS relations. This was most vividly demonstrated after the events of September when the US launched military operations in Afghanistan.

While Pakistan provided bases and other support to the US and its forces, the US still unequivocally reminded Pakistan that it had to stop terrorist organisations operating from within its borders. This was clearly aimed at addressing Indian concerns at Pakistan's support of terrorists operating in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. While General Musharraf attempted to take advantage of US appreciation of Pakistan's help in its operations in Afghanistan by asking the US to take an active part in resolving the Kashmir dispute, the latter's response was clear.

Apart from encouraging the two sides to continue bilateral dialogue, the US had no role to play. India's mobilisation of its troops after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and its refusal to resume talks with Pakistan until there was evidence that cross-border terrorism had stopped, drew no criticism from the US apart from the standard comment that the dispute should be resolved through dialogue. Meanwhile, as demonstrated by recent events, as far as the IndiaUS politico-strategic-military relationship is concerned, it has been business as usual.

High level contacts, arms sales and military exercises have continued as planned months ago. Firm plans have been developed for closer engagement in the future. This is the surest indication yet that IndiaUS relations are developing with a long-term perspective in mind and that the recent USPakistan re-engagement has had no discernible impact. So far as India-Australia relations are concerned, a strong case exists for a change in Australia's strategic outlook to include the South Asian region in its definition of 'Asia'. A case can also be made for better coordination of defence and foreign policies.

Given the recent developments between India and the US, Australia's major ally, the forthcoming foreign policy white paper should address this anomaly. India, as member of the Security Council, votes for a resolution naming North Korea as aggressor. It however abstains or votes against subsequent resolutions naming China as an aggressor and the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

US and Pakistan sign an aide-memoire under which the US agrees to a comprehensive military aid program ostensibly designed to help contain communism. The Nonaligned Movement which had evolved as an informal grouping in the s holds its first Summit Conference in Belgrade. IndiaChina border conflict. In the aftermath, US and the UK offer limited military assistance conditional on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. USUK brokered talks unsuccessful. Taking advantage of India's food crisis US pressures India into devaluing the Rupee and uses food aid as an instrument to try to change India's stance on international issues especially Vietnam.

IndiaPakistan sign the Simla Agreement. Agree to resolve any future problems bilaterally. Ceasefire line in Kashmir renamed Line of Control. Soviet Union intervenes in Afghanistan. President Reagan issues a directive instructing government agencies to seek improvement with relations and accommodated its requests for dual-use technology. President Bush Snr. Kickleighter visits India and proposes extensive training and exchanges between the two militaries.

US allows India to buy a cryogenic rocket engine for its space program from Russia but blocks the transfer of related technology. India and Pakistan conduct nuclear tests. Australia announces suspension of defence relations and non-humanitarian aid. Bilateral trade and investment not affected. In December Australia lifts its ban on visits by ministers and senior officials to India. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visits China. The two sides agree to initiate talks on the demarcation of the Line of Actual Control as well begin a security dialogue. President Clinton visits India and reiterates the US position that it would not mediate between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.

Foreign Minister Downer visits India and states that Australia must aim to build a very strong relationship with India. The new Bush administration makes it clear that India has the potential to keep the peace in the Indian Ocean and that it would help India in this endeavour. The two sides commit themselves to substantially increase the pace of high level policy dialogue, military-to-military exchanges and other joint activities. India upgrades its presence in the Andaman Islands and sets up its first tri-services command, the Far Eastern Strategic Command.

Following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December India deploys troops along the border with Pakistan. Tensions rise following further terrorist attacks prompting successful US attempts so far to defuse the situation. Special forces from the US and paracommandos from the Indian army conducts joint exercises.

India, Burma and Thailand agree to create a transport corridor linking the three countries and develop other infrastructure projects. It was also agreed: This would meet in FebruaryMarch the Joint Technical Group under the DPG would meet at the same time to discuss the promotion of bilateral ties in the field of defence production and research the US Joint Staff and the Indian Chief of Integrated Defence Staff would meet in the spring of and regularly thereafter to discuss tri-service institutions, military planning and tri-service doctrine.

On February , General Richard B. This was a second visit by a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within eight months. His visit had been preceded by a series of talks held by the Army and Navy Steering Groups ESG which resulted in the expansion of militarymilitary cooperation to 'levels unprecedented in the history of the bilateral relationship:' Navy-to-Navy Cooperation: A three-year program of substantive exercises, combined operations, port visits and conferences. These activities would include search and rescue operations, anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance as well as the continuation of the Malabar series of naval exercises.

Detailed discussions regarding joint usage of training sites, logistics support, airspace control, personnel exchanges and plans to combat terrorism and piracy were also held Army-to-Army Cooperation: A specific security cooperation program for and a framework for activities for and Purchases of other types of military equipment were expected to follow.

In March the US-India Joint Technical Group JTG was revived and several areas of cooperation begun before the sanctions were renewed and it was decided to explore opportunities for joint research, development and production of military systems. Later that month the Security Cooperation Group met in Washington to address future military sales and address export licensing procedures as well as an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to enhance US-India military interoperability.

In a speech delivered on 26 February , Ambassador Blackwill provided an update on the progress of bilateral military cooperation since the December DPG meeting: The two navies would undertake a variety of activities at least once a month over the next two years the two armies had agreed to expand counter terrorism cooperation and training and to extend participation in national, bilateral and multinational exercises the air force agenda had a similarly ambitious schedule of cooperation to date, the US Government had received applications for 81 items on the Munitions List.

None so far had been denied. Of these, 20 had been approved and were in various stages of notification to Congress. A variety of other high priority items including FGEF2J3 engines and advanced avionics for the LCA, undersea remotely operating vehicles, submarine combat systems, P3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft, satellite launch vehicle technical data, and ground sensors and electronic fencing for combating terrorism were in various stages of Congressional clearance. This is the largest single purchase of military equipment from the US ever.

It was also implied that the US was having discussions with Indonesia and Malaysia on the issue. Since early March, the latter had been serving as a military escort to ships providing 'logistical support for the campaign against global terrorism. It has also been reported that later during the year joint army counter-insurgency and jungle warfare exercises would be conducted at the Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School in northeastern India.

William Begert, Commander Pacific Air Forces, India represents a 'key piece of geography' in the region and to use it as a staging base for tankers or for airlift can provide greater flexibility than has been available to the US in the past. The two sides agreed to hold a future missile defence workshop in New Delhi and ' agreed on the value of pursuing a missile defense requirements analysis for India emphasis added significantly, the two sides 'reaffirmed their commitment to work together to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and agreed to hold further consultations in the coming weeks on the threat such proliferation poses to their common security interests' schedules for specialised military training programs and joint exercises for were finalised.

It has been reported that the State Department has put a restricted interpretation of the relaxed sanctions legislation that requires it to approve export licences on a case by case basis while the Pentagon is not averse to a broader reading in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, the two sides agreed on the 'serious inadequacies' of the International Criminal Court ICC and 'underlined the importance of cooperation between the U.

In October the US and Pakistan signed an aide-memoire under which the US agreed to a comprehensive military aid program. This was ostensibly designed to help build Pakistan as a bulwark against southward expansion of the Soviet Union, As a result the capability of Pakistan's armed forces were boosted considerably as they received modern artillery, Patton tanks, howitzers, transports and other state-of-the-art equipment.

The air force received modern F86 jet fighters and B57 bombers. US military teams improved Pakistan's military training. The US in turn also benefited. In it was announced that the US had been granted a ten-year lease to set up a 'communications facility' near Peshawar, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province. This was in fact one of a chain of electronic intelligence gathering stations that the US had set up to spy on the Soviet Union.